I consider a general speci cation of criminals' objective function and argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory is substituted for the traditional expected utility theory, the high-ne-lowprobability result Becker, 1968 only holds under speci c and strong restrictions.
Motivation
Becker's seminal paper on criminal behaviour dates from 1968. Becker posits that criminals are rational utility maximizers choosing in conditions of risk. His work is based on the assumption that criminals behave according to the subjective expected utility framework. Becker 1968 argued that individuals are deterred from criminal activities by a higher ne and by a higher probability of detection and conviction. The probability is costly whereas the ne is a costless transfer. Therefore, one should set the ne at its highest value. The probability of detection and conviction is used to complement the ne in deterring individuals. This result is known in the literature as the high-ne-low-probability result.
The assumption that criminals are expected utility maximizers has been at the heart of the criticism that Becker's theory has faced. 1 Some empirical contradictions between expected utility predictions and actual decisions have been found. Recent ndings have stressed that expected utility theory is not a goodpredictor in experimental situations. However that does not imply that the alternative theories perform better.
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There are already some empirical ndings on criminals' behavior that are not consistent with expected utility theory. Eide 1995 makes reference to studies where criminals tend to overestimate the probability of apprehension and thus a low probability of punishment has a major deterrent e ect. Block and Gerety 1995 have developed some experimental analysis on reactions to monetary penalties and risk of criminals and noncriminal students. They conclude that individuals tend to be risk averse in general but criminals tend to bemore sensitive to changes in the probability of punishment than students whereas noncriminal students tend to be more sensitive to changes in the monetary penalties than criminals. 3 Feeney 1986 has found that, among Californian robbers, only a small percentage had undertaken planning before committing a robbery and had thought about being caught.
The evidence seems to support the analysis of crime as a gamble at least for nancial or property crimes. As so, it is puzzling that people who tend to be risk averse in the sense of being insured against losses commit crimes more frequently that one might expect. The current economic theory has not fully responded to these criticisms: Polinsky and Shavell 1979 have discussed the importance of risk aversion in assessing Becker's theory; Lattimore and Witte 1986 have considered criminals' behavior within Kahneman and Tversky 1979 prospect theory; Eide 1995 has considered rank-dependent expected utility maximizers; Neilson and Winter 1997 and Neilson 1998 have discussed criminals' risk attitudes and state-dependent preferences. However, there has not been a more general assessment of the robustness of Becker's theory. This paper aims at lling this gap. The paper goes as follows: in section 2, I consider a general speci cation of potential o ender's objective function and argue that, when the general non-expected utility theory is substituted for the traditional expected utility theory, the high-ne-low-probability result only holds under speci c and strong restrictions. The main conclusions are pointed out in section 3.
Main Results
We follow an approach based on a typical utilitarian context where the social welfare is the sum of the utility of all individuals in this society. where P satis es Machina 1995 properties. For the purpose of this note, it is enough to assume that P i s t wice-di erentiable. where h is the harm in icted in the community b y each criminal act.
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The social planner has three policy instruments to maximize social welfare W : the probability of detection and conviction p, the ne f and the lump-sum 5 In this brief note, I have followed Machina 1995. The results used in that paper are based on his 1982 Econometrica paper -in particular, Theorem I -and his 1989 Journal of Economic Theory paper. The results of the 1995 Geneva P apers on Risk and Insurance paper are less rigorous since Machina does not pay enough attention to the possibility o f a kink along the certainty line in a states of the world picture, a point which is especially important in cases of insurance. However, for the present note, they are enough. 6 One can think that this crime is victimless and the harm is in icted upon the community rather than a given individual. The rst-term is the social marginal rate of substitution between ne and probability. It measures the rate at which the social planner is just willing to substitute probability for ne. The second-term is the price ratio faced by the social planner.
When the problem admits an interior feasible solution i.e. a less-thanmaximal ne is a feasible solution to the problem, the social marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio. However, if for any value of the ne, the social marginal rate of substitution is always larger than the price ratio, we have a corner solution and the optimal ne must be the maximal ne.
The maximal ne result holds when the rate at which the social planner is just willing to substitute probability for ne is always larger than the rate at which the social planner can change probability for ne: The rate at which the social planner is just willing to substitute probability for ne is p=f which is always larger than the price ratio which is p=f 1 + x p =B p note that B p is negative. As long as the marginal cost of producing the probability is strictly positive, the optimal ne is the maximal ne. This case embodies the classical Becker's argument: the ne is a costless transfer whereas the probability is costly. Therefore, as long as the probability is costly, the optimal policy is to set the ne at its highest feasible value. And 1 implies that:
f + p Therefore, one may beable to solve 1 for = 0 : an interior solution may exist and it might b e optimal. As a consequence, we can easily show that a necessary condition for a less-than-maximal ne is: f = p p=f .
Note that the argument for a less-than-maximal ne complements Polinsky and Shavell 1979 case. 8 In this framework, the ne is no longer a socially costless transfer because it induces a social loss embodied by the risk premium.
Example 3: The case of Yaari's dual theory Let us assume that individuals are risk-neutral in the context of the rank dependent expected utility theory. This is an application of Yaari's dual theory 1987.
In this case, a criminal maximizes the following functional: c = y+b,T , qpf where, following Karni and Safra 1990 , there exists 2 1=2; 1 such that q = , q is concave on 0; and q is convex on ; 1 . Furthermore, q p is large in the neighborhoods of the endpoints of its domain and q pp is close to zero in the middle range.
In this case we can argue that = q p , p f and :
One can check that a necessary condition for an interior solution is q p p q 1: a one percent c hange of the actual probability implies a less-than-one percent change of the perceived probability.
The ne is no longer a costless transfer: there is a social loss embodied by the di erence between actual and perceived expected ne. Therefore, one may h a v e to set a less-than-maximal ne.
3 Conclusion
Becker's argument is not robust when alternative speci cations of behavior under uncertainty are considered. It is true that as long as preferences exhibit rst-order stochastic dominance, probability and severity of punishment deter crime. However, the argument that a ne is a costless transfer does not carry through when alternative speci cations are used.
In this note, I have argued that the maximal ne result only holds when the rate at which the social planner is just willing to substitute probability for ne is always larger than the rate at which the social planner can change probability for ne. For example, when individuals are risk-averse, a less-than-maximal ne may be optimal because individuals care about the expected ne and a risk premium. When individuals behave according to Yaari's dual theory, a less-than-maximal ne may beoptimal because individuals care about a perceived expected ne rather than the actual expected ne.
